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Summary. In a (first price) al l -pay auction, bidders s imultaneously submit bids 
for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high b idder  receives the item. 
This auct ion is widely used in economics to model  rent seeking, R&D races, 
polit ical contests, and job  promot ion  tournaments.  We fully characterize qui- 
l ibr ium for this class of games, and show that the set of equi l ibria is much larger 
than has been recognized in the l iterature. When there are more than two players, 
for instance, we show that even when the auct ion is symmetric there exists 
a cont inuum of asymmetr ic  equil ibria. Moreover,  for economical ly important  
configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; 
asymmetr ic  equi l ibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric 
equil ibrium. 
JEL  Classification Numbers: D44, D72. 
I Introduction 
In a (first price) al l -pay auction, each b idder  (i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n) submits a (non-negative) 
sealed bid, x i, for an item valued by player i at v i. All players forfeit their bids, but the 
high bidder wins the item. (Ties are broken randomly).  When there is complete 
* We are grateful to Jacques Cr6mer, Chuangyin Dang, Jfirgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin 
Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful 
comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in 
Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, 
the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas 
A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Mon- 
treal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the 
Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges 
support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies 
at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de 
Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award. 
Correspondence to:M. R. Baye 
292 M.R.  Baye et al. 
information, the payoff to player i is given by 
f -x  i i f~ jsuchthatx j>x  i 
Vi 
u~(x 1 . . . . .  x,)  = m- -  xi if i ties for the high bid with m-  1 others (1) 
kv l -x  i if x i>x  j V j# i  
The all-pay auction is similar to a standard (winner pay) first-price auction, except 
that losers must also pay the auctioneer their bids) 
In an all-pay auction, one can interpret differences in the vi's as arising from 
differences in abilities. To see this, suppose the utility to player i of winning a prize of 
W by putting forth effort x i is u* = UI(W ) - ~ixi, where x i is effort, and/3~ is the 
marginal cost to player i of effort. Since behavior is invariant to affine transform- 
ations, we may just as well write the utility function as u~ =- u*/~ i = v~ - x i, where 
v i -- Ui (W)/~ ~. Thus, differences in the vi's may be due to differences in valuations or 
differences in the abilities of players to convert an entry into a prize: players with 
higher vi's can be thought of as stronger players. 
The all pay auction is widely used in economics because it captures the essential 
elements of contests. It has been used to model (1) the lobbying for rents in regulated 
and trade protected industries [cf. Moulin (1986a, b); Hil lman and Riley (1989); 
Hil lman and Samet (1987); Hil lman (1988) and Baye et al. (1993)], (2) technological 
competition and R&D races [cf, Dasgupta (1986)], and (3) a host of other situations 
including political campaigns, tournaments and job promotion. 2 Essentially, these 
economic problems boil down to a contest hat is an all-pay auction in effort; the 
player putting forth the greatest effort wins the prize, while the efforts of other 
contestants go unrewarded. 3 
Section II of this paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the 
first price all-pay auction with complete information. Our characterization shows 
that for n > 2 the set of equilibria is larger than recognized in the existing literature, 
and critically depends on the configurations ofplayer valuations. We show that with 
homogeneous valuations (vl = v a = v 3 . . . .  v,) there exists a unique symmetric 
equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. All of these equilibria are 
payoff equivalent, as is the expected sum of the bids (revenue to the auctioneer). 
1 The war of attrition is a second-price all pay auction: all players forfeit heir bids except the winner, who 
pays the second-highest bid. Hendricks et al. (1988) characterize the set of equilibria for the war of 
attrition with complete information i  continuous time and with general payoff unctions. 
2 For instance, inthe literature on rent seeking (Tullock, 1980), political campaigns (Snyder, 1989), job 
promotions (Rosen, 1986), and commitment (Dixit, 1987), the probability player i wins a contest by 
putting forth an effort ofx~ is modeled as x./Zjx, where 7> 0. As ? goes to infinity the player putting forth 
9 . . r j '  . . . .  
the greatest effort is certam to win the contest, and thus the hmlt of these models i  the all-pay auction. The 
all-pay auction may also be interpreted as the limit of many games with uncertainty or incomplete 
information, including the models of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Sfiglitz (1983), Weber (1985), 
and Bull, Sehotter and Weigelt (1987). As the incomplete information or uncertainty vanishes, these 
models converge to the complete information all-pay auction. 
3 Many other games with discontinuous payoffs (and in which only mixed-strategy equilibria exist) have 
a structure that is isomorphic to the all-pay auction, including Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), 
Broecker (1990) Raju et al. (1990), Baye and de Vries (1992), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992), 
Deneckere etal. (1992), and Dennert (1993). The characterization results presented in this paper are thus 
pertinent to a wide body of literature in economics. 
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When vl > v 2 = v 3 >_ v 4 >_ ... > v n, there is a unique "symmetric equilibrium" (sym- 
metric in the sense that all agents with identical values use the same strategy), as well 
as a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. The expected sum of the bids (revenue to the 
auctioneer) varies across the continuum of equilibria; there is not "revenue quival- 
ence." The case where v 1 > v z > v 3 > ... > v, is known to have a unique equilibrium 
(Hillman and Riley, 1989). 4 
Our theoretical results have important implications for economic applications 
of the all-pay auction. To highlight hese implications, Section I I I  reconsiders the 
regulation game analyzed by Wenders (1987) and Ellingsen (1991). 
II Characterization of equilibria 
The all-pay auction with complete information does not have a Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies, but does have a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies. Accordingly, 
let Gi(xl) denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) representing the equilib- 
rium mixed-strategy of player i. Player i is said to randomize continuously on A ~ R if 
he plays a mixed strategy that is atomless (i.e., contains no mass points) and has 
a strictly increasing cdf almost everywhere on A. 
Our first theorem characterizes quilibrium for the case when m > 2 players have 
the highest valuation of the prize. For this case, Hillman and Samet (1987) have 
shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium and a finite number of asymmetric 
equilibria where some agents with the highest valuation bid zero with probability 
one, and claim this exhausts all equilibria. Our Theorem 1 shows, however, that 
there actually exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria when three or more 
players have the highest valuation of the prize. Nonetheless, we show that all of the 
equilibria imply the same expected payoff (zero) for each player, and yield the 
auctioneer the same expected revenue. 
Theorem 1: When v 1 . . . . .  vm > vm+ 1 >- "'" >-- vn and m >_ 2: 
( A ) I f  m = 2, the Nash equilibrium is unique and symmetric. I f 3 <_ m <_ n, there is 
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, as well as a continuum of asymmetric Nash 
equilibria. In any equilibrium players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one, 
and at least two players randomize continuously on [0,vii. Each other player 
i t  {1 . . . . .  m} randomizes continuously on [b i, vl l ,  where b i >_ 0 is a free parameter, and 
bids 0 with positive probability /f b i > 0. 5 When two or more players randomize 
continuously on a common interval, their corresponding cdf's are identical over that 
interval. 6
(B)  In any equilibrium, the expected payoff to each player is zero. 
(C )  All equilibria are revenue quivalent: the expected sum of the bids in any 
equilibrium equals v 1. 
4 In this unique quilibrium, only players one and two actively bid (players 3through nbid zero with 
probability one). 
Ifb~ _> vl, player i bids 0 with probability one. 
6 Equation 2below summarizes the algebraic form of the complete s t of equilibria. 
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The formal proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proof contained in the Appendix 
for our Theorem 2 below, and is thus omitted (our 1990 working paper contains 
a complete proof). However, it is useful to highlight some of the features of 
equilibrium, as well as some intuition for the existence of a continuum of equilibria. 
The basic issues can be illustrated in the case where re=n=3,  so that 
v 1 -- v z = v3(- v, say). Theorem 1 implies, in this case, that in every equilibrium two 
players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v], while the third player 
randomizes continuously on the interval [b, v] and concentrates all remaining mass 
at zero (this mass is (b/v) 1/2, and is thus zero ifb = 0). (Note that b > 0 is an arbitrary 
constant). Since two players randomize continuously on [0, v], and any atoms in the 
third player's mixed strategy (player 3's, say) are isolated at 0, the highest bid is 
positive and unique with probability one. Furthermore, since zero is contained in 
the support of all three players' mixed strategies and at least two players use mixed 
strategies that do not put mass at zero, each player earns an expected payoff of 
zero. 
Given the characterization f the support of each player's mixed strategy, we 
know that all three players randomize continuously on [-b, v], and hence, all three 
are capable of generating a winning bid in the interval [b, v]. Equilibrium requires 
that, for any bid in [b, v], each player earns an expected payoff of zero, given the 
mixed strategies used by the other two players. Three non-degenerate mixed 
strategies over [b, v] are uniquely determined as the solution to three equations that 
set the expected payoff of each player i to be zero for bids in [b, v]: 
For i ~ j, k: ui(x ) = G~(x)Gk(x) Iv - x] - [1 - Gj(x)Gk(x )] x = 0 Vx e [b, v-l. 
The solution to this system of equations i symmetric and given by 
G 1 = G 2 = G 3 = (x /v )  1/2 for xe[b ,  v]. 
The probability player 3 submits a winning bid in the interval [0, b] is zero, since 
the characterization of player 3's support requires that (remaining) mass of 
G3(b ) - (b /v )  1/2 be isolated at 0 if b > 0. Given G3(b ), and the fact that only players 
1 and 2 can submit a winning bid in the interval [0, b] with positive probability, the 
mixed strategies for players 1 and 2 must satisfy 
For i r j, 3: ui(x) = Gj(x)G3(b)[v - x] - [1 - G~(x)G3(b)]x = 0 Vx~[b ,v ] .  
For a given b, the solution to this system of equations i symmetric: 
G t = 62 = (x/v)[  G3(b) ] -  1 = (x/v)(b/v) -  1/2 for xe [-0, b-1. 
These mixed-strategies for players 1 and 2 are sufficiently aggressive on the interval 
[0, b] to ensure that player 3 will not find it profitable to deviate by submitting a bid 
in the open interval (0, b). 
Thus, for a given b, we have constructed Nash equilibrium mixed-strategies for
the three players. On the interval [b, v], all players randomize continuously accord- 
ing to the three-player symmetric equilibrium. On the interval [0, b], player 3's 
mixed strategy concentrates all mass at zero (unless b = 0), while players 1 and 
2 randomize continuously according to mixed-strategies that are proportional to 
the two-player symmetric equilibrium. But since b is arbitrary, by varying bfrom 0 to 
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v one generates a cont inuum of equi l ibr ia,  rang ing from the un ique  symmetr ic  
equ i l ib r ium (when b = 0) to the extremely asymmetr ic  one in which only players 
1 and  2 actively compete (when b = v, p layer 3 bids zero with probabi l i ty  one). 7 
More  generally, Theorem 1 al lows us to explicitly character ize the algebraic 
form of the family of equ i l ib r ium mixed strategies for the case where v 1 -- v 2 = v 3 -- 
. . . .  v,, > Vm+ 1 > "'" >_V n. Let v = v 1 = v 2 = v 3 . . . . .  v m. By the theorem, players 
m + 1 through n b id zero with probabi l i ty  one, so suppose wi thout  loss of general i ty 
that  players i = 1,2 . . . . .  h, m > h _ 2, randomize  cont inuous ly  over [0,v] with 
players i=h+l , . . . ,m randomiz ing  cont inuous ly  over [bi, v], with bh+l< 
bh+z< ... <b , ,<v .  (The bi's are arbitrary,  and  vary ing the b~'s generates the 
cont inuum of equil ibria). P layers m + 1 through n bid zero with probabi l i ty  one. 
One  can easily verify that  the fol lowing family of cdf's are equi l ibr ium strategies for 
the players: 
i:? gxe  Ibm, v]: Gi(x) = i = 1 , . . . ,  m; 
['-XT1/(j- 1)[- -]l/(j- 1) 
Vxe [bj, b j+ t): 
j e{h  + 1 . . . . .  m-  1) (2) 
Gk(X ) = Gk(bk) k = j + 1 . . . . .  m; 
Vxe [0, bh+ 1): Gi(x  ) = Gk(b k i = 1 . . . .  , h; 
Lk>h _] 
Gk(X ) = Gk(bk) k = h + 1 , . . . ,  m. 
By Theorem 1, these are all the possible equ i l ib r ium cdf's, s
Our  next Theorem shows that revenue equivalence breaks down when one 
"strong" player competes against  several weaker, but  equal, players. This case is 
economica l ly  interest ing, because in the l i terature on regulat ion (cf. Rogerson,  1982 
and  El l ingsen, 1991), R&D races (Dasgupta,  1986), or pol it ical  contests (cf. Snyder, 
1989), one player (often the incumbent )  is modeled  as hav ing an advantage  over 
a number  of identical  challengers. H i l lman (1988) uses the case v 1 > v 2 = v 3 . . . .  v n to 
model  protect ionism,  and  erroneous ly  claims that  on ly  two agents actively partici-  
7 For instance, if v I = v 2 = v a = 1 and b = 1, then player 3 bids zero with probability one while players 
1 and 2 randomize according to a uniform distribution on [0,1]. If b = 0, all three players randomize 
according to the distribution function x 1/2 on [0, 1]. Ifb = 1/4, then players one and two randomize using 
G 1 = G 2 = 2x on [0, 1/4], while player 3 uses G a = 1/2 on [0,1/4]. All three players use G~ = x ~/2 on the 
interval [1/4, 1]. 
s The symmetric equilibrium (h = m) is used in Moulin (1986b) and Dasgupta (1986). Somewhat more 
general isthe case b h + ~ = v and 2 _< h _< m, i.e. some agents may be inactive. This is discussed in Hillman 
and Samet (1987, p. 72), Hillman (1988, p. 66) and Hillman and Riley (1989, fn. 12). Hillman and Samet 
(1987, p. 72) claim there are no other equilibria. Also, Proposition lc in Hilhnan and Riley which claims 
that at most one active agent bids zero with positive probability is erroneous, as up to m - 2 active agents 
can do so. 
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pate. Theorem 2 shows, however, that there actually exists a continuum of equilibria 
with up to n active participants. 9 
Theorem 2." When v 1 > v 2 . . . . .  v m > v,,+ l >_ ... >_ v,, and 3 <_ m < n: 
(A )  There exists a continuum of Nash equilibria. In any equilibrium, player 
1 randomizes continuously on the interval [0, v2] and players m + 1 through n bid zero 
with probability one. Each player i, i t  {2 . . . . .  m}, employs a strateyy G i with support 
contained in [0, v2] that has an atom ei(O) at O. The size of the atom may differ across 
players, but Hm=20r = (v  1 - v2) /v  1. Each G i is characterized by a number b i >_ O, 
where b i = 0 for at least one i r 1, such that Gi(x) = G i(O ) = ei(0) VxE [0, bi] and player 
i randomizes continuously on (bi, v2]. ~~ Furthermore, when two or more players in the 
set {2 . . . . .  m} randomize continuously on a common interval, their cdf's are identical on 
that interval) ~ 
(B)  In any equilibrium player one earns an expected payoff of  v 1 - v2, while each 
"of the players two through n earns an expected payoff of  zero. 
( C ) There is not revenue quivalence. In particular, the expected sum of the bids is 
where Ex~ varies across the continuum of equilibria, is minimized when symmetric 
players use symmetric strategies, and is maximized when only one of the players 
2 through m is active (i.e., submits positive bids with positive probability). 
This theorem, which is proved in the Appendix, allows us to construct the family 
of equilibrium mixed-strategies for the case where v 1 > v z . . . . .  vm> vm+z > 
--- _> v,. By the theorem, players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one, so 
suppose without loss of generality that of the players {2 . . . . .  m} players 
i = 2,. . . ,  h, h > 2 randomize continuously over (0, v2], with players i = h + 1 . . . . .  m 
randomizing continuously over (bi, ve], (where bi = v2 implies ~i(0)= 1) with 
bh+ ~ <_bh+z<_ ... <_bm<_v2. (Again, the bi's are arbitrary, and varying the bi's 
generates the continuum of equilibria). Players m + 1 through n bid zero with 
probability one. In light of Theorem 2, the family of cdf's below constitute the entire 
set of Nash equilibrium strategies: 
VxE[bm, v2]: Gi(x) I v l -v2  + x]  1/('-1' = i=2, . . . ,m 1) 1 
GI(X)= X~ --02-~-Xl(2-m)/(m-1) 
Vx~[bj, bj+ l): = Gk(bk) [ i = 2 ..... j 
L_ JL~>jV l  A 
9 This serves as a caveat to the claim by Magee, Brock and Young (1989, p. 217) that wo-ness i a general 
property of political contests. 
lo if bi> v2 ' ~i(0) = 1. 
1~ Equation 4 below summarizes the algebraic form of the complete set of equilibria. 
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j~{h+ 1 . . . . .  m-  1} 
Gk(x) = Gk(bk) k=j+l  ..... m; 
Gl(x)=XFVlV2L -v2+x]  (2 - i ) /u -1 )Fv l  L~jG~(bk)j-l-~/(i-~ 
Vxe [0, bh+ x): Gi (x )=[v l _v2+xq l / (h -1 )F_  ]-l/(h- a) 
Gk(x ) = Gk(bk) k = h + 1 . . . . .  m 
X [-Vl__l)2..~ X-](2-h)/(h 1)[- 7-1/(h 1) 
G,(x )=- l .  - -  / l ]] Gk(bk)/ 9 (4 )  
V2L vl J kk>h J 
In addition to the multiplicity of equilibria, the key implication of Theorem 2 is 
part C: expected revenue varies across the continuum of equilibria. Note that the 
theorem states that expected revenue is maximized in the equilibrium that maxi- 
mizes the expected bid of the player with the highest valuation. Given the form of 
the mixed strategies in equation (4), this occurs in the asymmetric equilibrium 
where player 1 and exactly one other player submit a positive bid with positive 
probability. ~z 
To complete the characterization, we need the following result originally 
formulated by Hil lman (1988) and Hil lman and Riley (1989) (a rigorous proof is 
contained in our 1990 CentER working paper): 
Theorem 3 (Hillman and Riley): I f  va > l) 2 > 1) 3 ~ " ' "  ~__ l)n, the Nash  equilibrium is 
unique. In equilibrium, player 1 randomizes continuously on [0, v2]. Player 2 ran- 
domizes continuously on (0, v2], placing an atom of  size g2(0)= (v 1 -Vz ) /V  1 at zero. 
P layers 3 through n bid zero with probabil ity one. Player l 's equilibrium payof f  is 
u* = v 1 - v2, while players 2 through n earn payoffs o f  zero. 
The algebraic form of the equilibrium mixed strategies for the case when 
v I > v 2 > v 3 _> ... >_ v, are as follows. Players 3 through n bid zero with probabil ity 
one. Players one and two randomize according to GI(X)----X/I) 2 and 
G2(x ) = (v 1 - v z + x)/v 1 for xe[O, v23. 
I I I  A concluding example 
We conclude with an example that highlights our results in the context of the 
regulatory contest discussed by Wenders (1987) and Ellingsen (1991). 23 Suppose 
12 Milgrom (1981) and Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) examine a similar issue in standard (winner pay) 
auctions, and find the opposite result often holds for classes of standard auctions: ymmetric strategies 
may yield higher expected revenues. 
13 Of course, there are numerous other applications, as noted in the introduction. For example, the 
following analysis is analogous to the case of an incumbent versus a number of potential entrants as 
discussed inRogerson (1982) and Dasgupta (1986). 
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M > 2 potential producers compete for the monopoly right to run a public utility. 
They face opposition from a consumer organization. The regulatory body decides to 
reward the organization which exerts the highest effort in the lobbying process. If 
this turns out to be one of the producers, the monopoly solution is implemented. If 
the consumer organization wins, the marginal cost pricing solution is implemented. 
If the consumer group wins, it earns a payoff equal to the sum of the would-be 
monopoly profits (call this amount "T" for "Tullock square") and the would-be 
deadweight loss (H, for "Harberger t iangle"). If one of the producers wins, it earns 
the monopoly profits, T. Thus v 1 = T+ H and 1)2 = / )3  . . . . .  VM+ 1 = T. By The- 
orem 2A, there exists a continuum of equilibria to this game, and by 2C the equilibria 
are not revenue quivalent. In particular, the expected revenue to the regulator is 
v 2 ( vz~ T 2 H 
E~x~ =--  v 2+ 1 -  Ex  1 -  t- (5) v 1 \ v l /  T+H -T---~ Exl" 
Since Ex~ varies depending upon which equilibrium is played, when the regulator 
receives the lobbying expenditures a "bribes" she is not indifferent to the equilib- 
rium that is played. By Theorem 2C, Exl is maximized when only one of the firms 
participates in the lobbying process. 14 The selfish regulator does best in the 
equilibrium where only the consumer group and one of the M firms engage in 
lobbying. 
It turns out that the expected social waste due to lobbying also depends on which 
equilibrium is played. Suppose that only a proportion 2, 0 < 2 < 1, of the lobbying 
expenditures is socially wasteful (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1977; Brooks and 
Heydra, 1990; and Dougan, 1991). Expected social waste, W, equals the expected 
deadweight loss plus a fraction 2 of the expected lobbying expenditures. If P~ is the 
probability the consumer group wins, then the expected social waste is 
W = (1 - P~)H + 2E~x i. (6) 
Using equation (5) and the fact ~s that Exl = P~vl + vz - v~, this can be written as 
W = ;~T + (1 - 2) HH~(T-  E[xl]). (7) 
If2 = 1 (all of the lobbying is socially wasteful) the expected social waste is T. Notice 
that this result is independent ofwhich equilibrium is played. ~ 6 In contrast, when 
14 As an example, consider the three player case with v 1 = 2, and/)2 = / )3  = 1. In the most asymmetric 
equilibrium, player 3 bids zero with probability one, while G 1 = x and G z = (1 + x) /2  on [0, 1]. In this 
equilibrium, Ex  1 = 1/2, and by equation (5), ~,Ex l  = 3/4. In the "symmetric equilibrium", player one 
randomizes with Gt(x ) = x[(1 + x)/2] - 1/2, while players two and three use G 2 = G 3 = [(1 + x) /2 ]  1/2. In 
this case, 
Z Exl = E5 - 2,//?/3, 
which is less than 3/4, as of course it must be by Theorem 2C. 
15 Theorem 2B implies that, in equilibrium, Eu 1 = P ly1  - -  Ex  1 = v 1 - v 2. 
16 Ellingsen (Proposition 1) considers the case where 2 = 1 and a finite number of possible equilibria. 
Equation 7, however, reveals that Ellingsen's result is valid across the entire continuum of other 
equilibria. 
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0 _< 2 < 1 the expected social waste is a decreasing function of Exl, which in turn 
depends on which equilibrium is played. By Theorem 2C, it follows that the more 
symmetric the bidding strategies of the producers, the greater the expected social 
waste, W. This holds irrespective of 2, except when lobbying is completely wasteful 
(in which case, 2 = 1 and hence W = T). When 2e [0, 1), different equilibria imply 
different expected social wastes, and society prefers fewer firms lobbying for 
monopoly rights to more. 
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2 
Proof of 2A and 2B: The proof of parts A and B of Theorem 2 are contained in the 
following lemmas. Before proceeding, note that if gi andsl are the upper and lower 
bounds of the support of player i's mixed strategy, then Vi, vl > gi ->& -> 0. Also, recall 
that ei(x) is the mass placed at x by player i's mixed strategy. 
The first lemma is used in Lemma 2 to show that the lower bound of the support 
of each player's mixed strategy is zero. 
Lemma 1: If 3i such that s i ~>._Sj and e~(~j) = 0, then _sj = 0 and 
G j(0) = limxt_~iGj(x ). If, in addition, ei(_si) = 0, then G j(0) = Gj(_sl). 
Proofi Let uj(xj, G_j) denote f s  payoff to bidding xj when strategies G_j are 
employed by the other n -  1 players. Now u i(s j, G_j) = -_sj < 0 for_sj > 0. Since the 
same holds for uj(xt, G_j) for xj <sf, and also for xj =si if e~(~i)= 0, the claim 
follows. [] 
Lemma 2: s i = 0 Vi. 
Proof." Clearly, v~ >_s i > 0 Vi, so it is sufficient o show that no player employs 
a mixed strategy that has a support with a strictly positive lower bound. By way of 
contradiction, suppose S --- {i[_s~ > 0} is nonempty, i.e.,& > 0 for at least one i. 
If S consists of a single player i, then sl >s  t = 0 Vj # i. In this case, if ~i(s~) = 0, 
Lemma 1 implies that G j(0)= Gj@i) Vj--/=i, which in turn implies that 
u~(_si, G-i) < limx~+o ui(xi, G-i). This contradicts the hypothesis that s i > 0. If 
ei(_si) > 0, then Vj # i, ~j(~i) = 0, so G j(0) = limxj+_~ Gj(xj) leads to a similar contradic- 
tion. 
If S contains more than one player, then an argument similar to that just made 
implies _s i =_sj > 0 Vi, jsS.  At least one player ieS must employ a mixed strategy 
with ei(~i) = 0, for otherwise any j eS  could gain by increasingsj by a small ~ > 0 
(unless j = v j, in which case j has incentive to reduce the bid vj to 0). But this 
means that there exist i , jr such that si =sj  > 0 and ei@~) = 0, a contradiction to 
Lemma 1. 
Thus, we conclude that s i = 0 for all i. [] 
The next lemma shows that, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player 
2 through n must employ a strategy that places an atom at 0, while player 1 cannot 
employ a strategy that places an atom at 0. This, in conjunction with Lemma 2, 
implies that players 2 through n earn equilibrium expected payoffs, u*, of 
zero. 
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Lemma 3: (a) el(0) = 0; 
(b) Yi % 1, ei(0) > 0. 
(c) u* = 0 Yi r 1. 
Proofi (a) Since player i would never use a strategy that puts mass on (vi, ~)  (setting 
the bid equal to zero strictly dominates uch a strategy), player 1 clearly has no 
incentive to use a strategy that puts mass in the interval (vz,  v l ] .  Hence, 
Yi, gl -< v2 < vl, which guarantees that player i must have an equilibrium payoffu~ of 
at least v l  - v z > 0. This, and the fact that not all players can use mixed strategies 
that have an atom at 0, implies that player l's mixed strategy cannot place an atom 
at 0. (b) From part (a), u~ > 0 in every neighborhood above 0, so player 1 must outbid 
every other player with a probability that is bounded away from zero. Thus, every 
player but player 1 must use a strategy that has an atom at 0. (c) Since player l's 
mixed strategy does not have an atom at 0, it follows from part (b) that Vi ~ 1, 
u~ = ui(0, G_ i) = 0 []  
We have now established that zero is the lower bound of the support of each 
player's equilibrium mixed strategy, that all players but player 1 must employ 
equilibrium strategies that contain an atom at 0, and that the equilibrium payoffs for 
players {2, 3 . . . . .  n} are zero. The next lemma establishes that at least two players 
have v 2 as the upper bound of the support of their mixed strategies. 
Lemma 4: g~ _< v2Vi, with strict equality for at least two players. 
Proofi From the proof of Lemma 3, gi <- v2Vi .  By way of contradiction, suppose 
g~ <v 2 for all i. By bidding above g-maxk{gk} by an arbitrarily small amount, 
player 2 can earn arbitrarily close to v 2 - g > 0 = u*, which contradicts Lemma 3. 
Thus, gi = v2 for at least one i. Another player j # i  must also have gs = v2, for 
otherwise player i could gain by reducing i by a small e > 0. [] 
The next five lemmas provide the rough characterization f the equilibrium 
strategies of players (2, 3 . . . . .  n} stated in Theorem 2A. For notational convenience, 
we define Ai(x ) ~ H jc_iG j(x), Aik(X ) ~ H j~i,k G j(x), and Aikh(X ) ~-- Hj:~i,k,h G j(x ). 
Lemma 5: For all j e { 1, 2 . . . . .  n}, Gj contains no atoms in the half open interval 
(0, v2]. 
Proof: Suppose one of the cdf's, say Gi, has an atom at xi~(0, v=]. Lemma 2 implies 
that Vx~(0,v2], AisG i > 0, and hence Ai jG  ~ has an upward jump at x~, Vj ~ i. This 
follows directly from the monotonicity of the cdf's. For xi < v s this implies that 
player j can gain by transferring mass from an e-neighborhood below x~ to some 
neighborhood above xi. At x~ = v s it pays for j to transfer mass from an 
~-neighborhood below x~ to zero. Thus, there would be an e-neighborhood below x~ 
in which no other player's mixed strategy puts mass. But then it is not an equilibrium 
strategy for player i to put mass at x~. [] 
Define Bi(xg ) - (vi - x i )A i (x i )  - -  x i (1  - A i (x i )  ) = v iA i (x i )  - -  xl .  
Lemma 6: B~(x~) is constant and equal to u* at the points of increase of Gi on 
(0, v 2] Vi. Bi (x i )  <_ u*  if x i is not a point of increase of G i on (0, v23. 
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Proof: By Lemma 5 there are no atoms in (0, V2]. Thus, Bi(xl) is the expected payoff 
to player i from bidding x i s (0, v2]. Ifxl is a point of increase of G i, player i must make 
his equilibrium payoff at xl. [] 
Lemma7: Vxs(O, v2],3il, i  2 such that re>0:  Gi(x + e) - G i (x -  e) > O, i= 
il, i2. [ ]  
Proof: Immediate. 
Lemma 8: si = 0 Vi > m. 
Proof." Without loss of generality assume ~,,+ 1 = maXi>m{Si}. Suppose g,,+l ~ 0. 
Then there exists an interval (g,,+ 1 - e, Sin+ 1] in which Gin+ 1 increases and in which 
Bm+l(X)- Hm+ I :O:l)m+lAm+l(x)--x. Thus, vm+l=x/Am+l(X)VXs(gm+l--,~,, 
s,,+ a]. From Lemma 7, Vxs(g,,+ 1, Vz] 3is {2,..., m} such that G i is increasing at x. 
Since there are no atoms in (g,,+l,v2], for each XS(gm+I,V2] there is a player 
ie {2 .. . . .  m} such that v~ = x/Ai(x ). This implies that for any x > g,,+ 1, but arbitrarily 
close to ~-,,+1, there exists an i~{2 . . . . .  m} such that A~(x)=Hj~iGj (x)> 
IIj~Gj(gm+ 2) > Hj~.m+ ~ Gj(g,,+ 1) = Am+ ~(gm+ 1), a contradiction to the fact that 
v,~+, < v~. Thus, S-m+l : 0. 
Lemma 8 demonstrates that when n > m, players m + 1 through n bid zero with 
probability one. We now proceed to characterize the equilibrium strategies of 
players 1 through m. 
Lemma9: Suppose x~(0,v2] is a point of increase in G~ and Gj for 
i, js{2,3, . . . ,m}. Then G i = Gj at x. 
Proof: By Lemmas 3c and 6, Bi (x)=Bj (x)=O,  which may be written as 
(v 2 - x)Gj(x)Ao(x ) - x[1 - G j(x)Aij(x) ] = 0. This implies that G j(x)Aij(x ) = x/v 2 = 
Gi(x)Aji(x ). Division by Aij = Aji > 0 gives Gj(x) = Gi(x ). [] 
Lemma 10: If G~, is {2,..., m} is strictly increasing on some open subset (a, b), 
where 0 < a < b < v 2, then G~ is strictly increasing on the entire interval, (a, v2]. 
Furthermore, at least one of players {2 .... , m} randomizes continuously on the 
interval (0, v2]. 
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that Gi were constant on (b, c), b < c _< v 2. Then from 
Lemma 5, @(b) = Gz(c). By Lemma 7, there exists an e > 0 such that on the interval 
(b, b + e) there exist at least wo players, hand k, with strictly increasing cdf's over the 
interval. At least one of these players, say h, must be an element of {2,..., m}. Since 
the mixed strategies contain no atoms in the interval (0,v2], from Lemma 
9 Gh(b ) = Gi(b ) > 0. But from Lemmas 3c and 6, Bi(b ) = Bh(b ) = Bh(X ) gxs(b,  b + e). 
Hence, Bi(x ) <_ Bh(X ) Vx~(b, b + e), since such values ofx do not lie in i's support. But 
this implies that A~(x) < Ah(X), and hence Gh(X ) < @(X), a contradiction to the fact 
that Gi(b ) = Gh(b), G h is increasing on (b, b + e), and G i is constant on (b, b + g). The 
second statement follows from the first part of Lemma 10 and from Lemmas 4 
and 7. [] 
Lemma 10 thus shows that, in equilibrium, at least one of the players {2, 3,..., m} 
randomizes continuously on (0, v2]. Notice that, by Lemma 3, the mixed strategies 
302 M.R. Baye t al. 
of each of the players {2, 3 . . . . .  m} contain an atom at 0 but, by Lemma 5, no player's 
mixed strategy places an atom in the half-open interval (0, v2]. Lemma 10 thus 
implies that if Gi, i t  {2, 3 .... , m} is increasing over any interval (a, b), 0 < a < b < v2, 
then G i must be strictly increasing on the interval (a, v2]. Hence, any gap in the 
support of player i's mixed strategy must be of the form (0, bi] for some bi > 0. 
Furthermore, from Lemma 9, for any point of increase x~(0,v2] of G~ and 
G j, i, j e {2, 3,.. . ,  m}, these distribution functions must take identical values. 
In order to provide the complete characterization f the equilibrium distribu- 
tions provided in Equation (4) of the text, we need to say more about player l's 
equilibrium strategy and payoffs. We continue with 
Lemma 11: (a) gl = v2. Furthermore, for every bid 0 < x < 1-)2 in the support 
of G 1, Gl(x  ) < Gi(x ), i~{2 .... , rn}. 
(b) u~ = vl - v2. 
Proof: (a) From Lemma 10, at least one je  {2, 3 . . . . .  m} randomizes continuously on 
(0, v2]. Without loss of generality suppose player two is such a player. From Lemma 
3, player l's mixed strategy does not have an atom at 0, and from Lemma 5, no 
player's mixed strategy has an atom in (0, v2]. Thus, there exists ome point xe(0, vz) 
at which G~(x) is increasing. At any such point, Bl(X) > vl - v2, since the right-hand- 
side represents what player 1 can obtain by bidding v 2 with probability one. 
Rearranging this expression we obtain A~(x)> (v l -  v2 + x)/v l .  From Lemmas 
3 and 6, Az(X ) = x/v 2. Subtracting A 1 from A 2 gives 
A2(x ) - Al(x ) <_ [(v 2 - x)(1 - vl /Vz)] /v 1 < O, 
where the strict right-hand inequality follows from the assumption that v 2 > x and 
vl > v2. Thus, at any point of increase of G1 in (0, v2), A~ > A2. This directly implies 
that G 2 > Gt for any such point. But since G 2 has support [0, v2] and G1 has no 
atoms, this implies gt = v2. Furthermore, since for any other player i t  {2 .. . . .  m} and 
for any x e [0, v2], G2(x) < G~(x), we have the second claim. (b) Part (a), together with 
Lemma 6, implies that player l's equilibrium payoffis u* = Vl - v2. [] 
This completes the proof to part B of Theorem 2. To complete the proof to part 
A we must show: 
Lemma 12: (a) Player 1 randomizes continuously on support [0, v2]. 
(b) //~= 2~i(0) = (v 1 - v2)/v 1. 
Proof" (a) We know that gl = v2 and_s~ = 0. Suppose there is a gap (a, b) in which 
G~(x) is constant, 0 < a < b < v 2. By Lemmas 6, 7, and 8, we know that at x = a there 
are at least two players i,k~{2 .... , m} such that Ai(x)= Ak(x ) = x/v  2. At x = b 
this holds as well. In addition, since a and b are in the support of 
GI, A l (x  ) = (v 1 - v 2 + x)/v 1, x = a, b. Thus we have 
Gl(x)Gk(x)Aikl(x ) = x/v2, x = a, b (A1) 
Gi(x)Gk(x)Aikl(x ) = (v 1 - v z + x)/v 1, x = a, b. (A2) 
Since G~(a)= Gl(b ) by assumption, and by Lemma 9 Gi(x)= Gk(x ) for xe[a ,b ] ,  
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equation A1 implies 
[ Gk(a)Aikl (a) ]/[ Gk(b)Aikl (b) ] = a/b, 
while equation A2 implies 
[ [Gk(a)]ZAikl(a)]/[ Gk(b)]ZAigl(b)] = (v 1 - v 2 -k- a)/(v t - -  l.) 2 ..If- b). 
Combining these gives Gk(a ) = Gk(b )[b(O + a)/a(O + b)], where 0 -- v 1 - v2 > 0. Since 
b/a > (b + O)/(a + 0), this implies Gk(a ) > Gk(b), which contradicts he fact that b > a. 
Thus, player l's mixed strategy distributes positive mass to every open interval in 
[0, v2]. This, along with Lemmas 3a and 5, implies that player l's mixed strategy 
contains no atoms and has a strictly increasing cdf on its support, [0, v2]. Part (b) 
follows from part (a), Lemma 6, and Lemma 1 lb. [] 
We now know that in any equilibrium: (1) player 1 earns an expected payoff of 
vl - v2, while all other players earn expected payoffs of zero; (2) player l's mixed 
strategy contains no atoms or gaps in its support, and thus G 1 is strictly increasing 
on its support, [0, v2]; (3) players m + 1 through nbid zero with probability one; and 
(4) all other players j~ {2 . . . . .  m} play a mixed-strategy that has an atom at zero and 
a strictly increasing cdf on some interval of the form (bj, v2], where bj >_ 0 for all j, 
with strict equality for at least one j. Lemma 9 guarantees that in subintervals of 
(0, v2] where the mixed strategies of any subset of the players {2, 3 .... , m} apply 
a positive mass, the players have the same value of their cdf's. The system of 
equations given by Bi(x ) = u* for i~{1, 2 .... , m} in Lemma 6 thus determines the 
equilibrium ixed-strategies, Gi(x ), for any given nonnegative ctor (b~, b 3 .. . . .  b,,) 
for which at least one b i = 0. These are given in equation (4) in the text. Recursive 
application of Lemma 9 for given bi's implies that these constitute all the equilibria. 
Proofof2C: Theorem 1 in Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (1993) establishes that, 
in any Nash equilibrium, r~Ex i = (/)2//)1)/)  2 ~- (1 - VZ/Vl)EX 1. Hence it is sufficient to 
establish that (a) Ex 1 is maximized in an equilibrium in which all but one of players 
2 through m bid zero with probability one, and (b) Exl  is minimized when players 
2 through m play symmetric strategies. Our proof makes use of the fact that if cdf 
F stochastically dominates cdf G, then EF[X] > Ea[x-]. 
(a) By Lemma 10, in any equilibrium at least one of the players 2, 3 .... , m, 
randomizes continuously on the interval (0, v2]. Suppose player i is such a player. By 
Lemma 6, Bi(x) = 0 Vxe(0, v2]. Isolating the cdf of player 1, G~, in the expression for 
A i yields Gl(x ) = Ex/(v2Hj~l,iGi(x)) ]. Hence, across all equilibria, Gl(x ) is mini- 
mized for each xe(0,v2] when the denominator is maximized (note that every 
equilibrium ust have an i t  {2 .... , m} randomizing continuously over (0, v 2 ]). This 
implies that Gl(x ) is minimized when Hj~ 1.~Gj(x)= 1 (that is, in the equilibrium 
where only players 1 and i actively bid.) But this means that G 1 in this asymmetric 
equilibrium stochastically dominates the corresponding Gl's that arise in the other 
equilibria, which implies Exa is maximized in this equilibrium. 
(b) Similarly, suppose player ie {2,..., m} randomizes continuously on (0, v2]. 
Then Gl(x ) is maximized for each xe [0, v2] across equilibria when Hj~ 1,iGj(x) is 
minimized. By Lemma 12, in any equilibrium player 1 randomizes continuously 
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over (0, V2], This implies by Lemma 6 that in any equilibrium Al(x ) = (vl - ~)2 + X)/ 
v 1, Vx e(0, Vz]. Since A ~ (x) = Hj~ a Gj(x) is constant across equilibria, Hie  1 .i Gj(x) is 
minimized in an equilibrium in which Gi(x) is maximized. But by Lemmas 5, 9, and 
10, in any equilibrium and for every j~ {2,..., m}, j va i, Gi(x ) < Gj(x) Vxe[0, v2]. 
Hence maximizing G~ (x) across equilibria requires maximizing the minimum of the 
Gk(X)'S, k ~ {2,..., m}. Since for each x E(0, v2], A l(x) is constant across equilibria, 
this is done by setting Gk(X ) = G~(x) for all k, je  {2,..., m} on [0, v2]. [] 
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